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Chinese Dreams of Socialism—Visions of a Better Future
Gerda Wielander
Introduction
In the autumn of 2013, following the third plenum of the 18th Party Congress, China’s new 
premier Xi Jinping issued a 5000 character-long communiqué in which he outlined the aims 
of the new leadership and its ideological foundations. Xi had made his mark a year earlier by 
first mentioning the ‘Chinese dream’, thus presenting journalists, China watchers and 
academics with the gift of a metaphor that has become a staple in their headlines and 
analyses. In the party communiqué, Xi once again mentions the China dream; specifically 
speaking of the ‘Chinese dream of reinvigorating the Chinese nation’, which will be realised 
by building a ‘strong, wealthy, democratic, civilized, harmonious country [achieved by the 
means of] socialist modernization’(Xi, 2013; translation by the author).
In the context of such political rhetoric, this chapter analyses socialism as a category of 
‘Otherness’ in China’s political development. It is argued that ‘Otherness’ persists in two 
distinct areas: on the one hand socialism emerged from an ‘Other’, essentially Western, 
intellectual tradition. Yet its visionary nature also held the promise of creating an ‘other’ 
China; one distinct from the weak and beleaguered remnant of a once powerful empire and 
one that might be able to leave its social problems behind. The concept of socialism quickly 
gained wide legitimacy in China, as an instrument for the interpretation of Chinese society 
and a tool for policy implementation. Most importantly, it held the promise of empowerment 
as a nation built in a mould different from Western societies. Socialism promised China the 
chance for establishing a ‘politics of the Other’, not as an act of self-exoticisation, but as a 
way to be equal(ly strong), yet culturally and morally different from its Western counterparts. 
This chapter is divided into three parts. The first part examines the meanings of socialism in 
the first decades of the twentieth century, which ranged from vague notions of social harmony 
to calls for social revolution and upheaval. This section shows that moderate concepts of 
social equality achieved through policy and governance, which closely resembled European 
socialist thinking of the time, were forced to give way to the concept of social revolution and 
continuous class struggle as a means to empower the Chinese nation and to liberate itself from 
Western economic and intellectual imperialism. Section two presents Mao’s re-interpretation 
of Marxism, which promised a radical change of society in order to put into practice the 
vision of a modern, socialist China which would overtake the West in terms of industrial 
production and scientific development. This socialism was culturally inflected and distinct 
from Western or Soviet versions. It promised a vision of plenty, which stood in sharp contrast 
to the realities of the day, but which has in many ways been exceeded in China today. Finally, 
the third part of the chapter contends that Deng Xiaoping’s ‘Socialism with Chinese 
Characteristics’ was a conscious reinterpretation rather than a rejection of Maoism, and 
constituted a tool to prepare China’s integration into the world economy. It is further argued 
that Deng’s socialism –like Mao’s– also served as a marker of difference. Built on this legacy, 
socialism remains a key signifier of Chinese official identity, whose meaning continues to be 
debated, reconfigured and described in culturally sensitive terms, be it the Confucian-
inflected ‘relatively prosperous’, ‘harmonious’ society or Xi’s Chinese ‘dreams’. The chapter 
concludes that socialism as China’s core ideology continues to be presented as a political 
category that holds promise of a distinctly Chinese vision of the future; socialism is a key 
feature of Chinese national and political identity today and a key characteristic of the ‘China 
model’, which serves as a new and powerful ‘Other’ in global politics.
Chinese thinkers first started to contemplate socialism in the context of modernization. From 
the start in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, modernization was not merely a 
rational striving for prosperity, peace, or freedom. Along with those aims there was always a 
great preoccupation about how the Chinese culture should or should not be altered in pursuit 
of these goals (Metzger, 1996: 9). While the capitalist model practised by the West offered 
answers to China’s economic development issues, its problems were also evident to Chinese 
reformers. Socialism’s appeal to modernisers did not lie in providing a solution to current 
problems. Its attraction lay in the fact that it was a Western, but hitherto unrealised vision of a 
more fair society; it thus provided an alternative pathway to capitalism and the modernization 
model of the West. Starting the modernization process relatively late compared to the big 
nation states against which Chinese intellectuals, political activists and leaders measured the 
progress of their own nation also provided the opportunity to do things differently, and 
possibly better. Pursuing socialism offered the promise and held the potential of avoiding the 
mistakes of the West by building a modern, yet uniquely Chinese society. As Xi Jinping’s 
2013 communiqué shows, the search for a definition of what exactly socialism should mean 
and how it was to be achieved is what has continued to shape China’s social and political 
developments for the last one hundred years. 
Social Harmony vs. Social Revolution: Different Positions in the First Half of the Twentieth 
Century
Depending on where one marks its starting point, the history of Chinese socialism is about 
120 years old. While it may seem obvious to associate its beginnings with the founding of the 
Chinese Communist Party in 1921, the earliest instance of ideas of socialism being discussed 
was in fact Chinese missionary publications of the 1870s. European and Christian ideas of 
socialism fed into a famous utopia called Datong Shu (Book of Great Unity) by Kang 
Youwei1, and continued to influence Kang’s younger colleague Liang Qichao (1873-1929), 
arguably the most influential intellectual of his time. The Book of Great Unity was only 
published in 1935, but various chapters of it were available in the burgeoning Chinese 
printing press of the early twentieth century, and its ideas were widely known among the 
reformers of the time. It provides a comprehensive view of an ideal world and society 
including a step-by-step programme to be followed in order to achieve this ideal state of 
being. Key to Kang’s vision of the ‘Great Unity’ was the removal of nine barriers in the 
world. These barriers, which refer to nations, class, race, gender, family, profession, 
inconsistency (referring to laws), species, and suffering (Bauer, 1971: 418) need to be 
removed in order to attain the ideal of a worldwide egalitarian society that knows no national 
boundaries, speaks in one world language, believes in one (new) religion and is entirely 
vegetarian (as all species are equal, animals cannot be killed for consumption). Kang’s vision 
included the eradication of all racial and gender differences in appearance (rather than equal 
value of their difference), the abolition of marriage in favour of time-limited love contracts, 
the dissolution of the family, and the establishment of comprehensive social service 
organisations. In this world of Great Unity only four things were forbidden: laziness, personal 
cult, competition, and abortion (see Bauer, 1971; also compare Callahan, 2013: 109-114). 
Radical and visionary in its conception, Kang’s utopia was hugely influential on the next 
generation. 
From the very early days of reforms in the nineteenth century, which were characterized by 
the intent to learn useful methods and tools from the West while retaining a Chinese cultural 
essence, Chinese thinkers concerned with the optimal pathway for the future hoped to find a 
way for the country which considered not only the West’s successes, but also its failures. In 
this context, the effect of the First World War on Western societies and economies as 
witnessed by many of China’s reformers was of crucial importance. It led to a profound 
disillusionment with the Western system; at the same time, reports from Bolshevik Russia 
provided a new source of inspiration. Socialism offered a great paradox by being both 
Western and anti-Western inasmuch as it derived from the Western intellectual tradition, but 
also provided a tool to critique the socio-economic order of the Western world and its impact 
on Asia. Furthermore, socialism was linked to the idea of a strong state, an important concern 
of Chinese reformers. As Edmund Fung puts it “to be socialist was to be modern, 
international, and as advanced as possible” (Fung, 2010: 194).
Culturally speaking, socialism chimed with Confucian notions of the rejection of material 
profit, as well as core cultural values like universal love and social harmony as expressed in 
one of China’s classics, The ‘Book of Rites’ (Liji).2 Concepts used to this day in socialist 
rhetoric, like datong (great harmony), xiaokang (being relatively prosperous) and he 
(harmony) are all derived from this classical source and evoke an ideal past to help identify 
with modern socialism. Thus adopting socialism as a modern vision for China allowed 
reformers to strategically tap into pre-modern Chinese thought.3
Against this philosophical background, it was The Revolutionary Alliance Programme of 
1905 which first called for ‘social revolution’ to ward off the negative consequences of 
capitalism as observed in the West. Thus it was the founding fathers of the CCP’s main rival, 
Sun Yatsen’s Guomindang (GMD), who first incorporated socialist ideals into their 
manifesto4. Minsheng, most commonly translated as ‘people’s livelihood’, was one of the 
three pillars of Sun Yatsen’s ideology. He first used the term in 1905 and returned to it in 
1919, revising and reflecting upon it until his death in 1925. Sun likened it at various times to 
‘socialism’ as well as ‘communism’, although Sun’s ‘communism’ needs to be understood 
not in Marxist terms, but as an interpretation of the traditional Chinese philosophical term 
datong by Kang Youwei. It is an ideal, a utopia, whose appeal was wide enough to form a 
basis upon which to unite the various factions within the GMD at the time (Bergere, 1998: 
352-387 and Myers, 1989: 240).
For Sun, the mainspring of social evolution was harmony, and the principle force in human 
evolution was cooperation, not conflict, which he abhorred. By trying to understand the 
origins of the various social conflicts Sun thought it would be possible to draw up policies to 
ensure economic development for all social groups, and hence to preserve the environment 
and to restore social harmony, and crucially, avoid revolution. Minsheng was synonymous 
with subsistence and became the driving force of social change in Sun’s ideology. 
Associating socialism exclusively with the CCP thus ignores the fact that non-communist 
intellectuals with a socialist impulse formed a crucial part of the reformist alternative, which 
was an important feature of modern Chinese political thought. These reformist socialists 
during the Republican period had no Marxist inheritance; instead they were statist liberals and 
social democrats (Fung, 2010: 3). For Zhang Dongsun (1886-1973), one of China’s foremost 
reformist socialists in the Republican period, socialism, rather than a social or economic 
system, was a view of life as well as a worldview, which held the promise of spiritualist and 
materialistic transformation for all parts of society, individual or collective. It presented a 
‘new morality’, which promised to address the unsatisfactory status quo (Zhang as quoted in 
Fung, 2010: 197). Instead of linking socialism to China’s cultural values, Zhang Dongsun 
drew parallels between socialism and Christianity, both important forms of Western life and 
culture, which to him contained shared values. He also considered all forms of socialism as 
quasi-religious (Zhang as quoted in Fung, 2010: 236). In this sense there is a link between the 
socialist reformers of the Republic and many liberals in today’s China (some of them 
Christians), who emphasise the importance of the spiritual and the transcendental in their 
promotion of an alternative social and political system for the People’s Republic of China.5 
What Zhang Dongsun shared with Liang Qichao and Sun Yatsen was the promotion of social 
harmony over social struggle; to him and to many of China’s reformist socialists, socialism 
was about promoting the interest of the whole society, not just that of one class: the ‘greatest 
happiness for the greatest number’ as Zhang put it using Jeremy Bentham’s term (Zhang as 
quoted in Fung, 2010: 248).
However, these gentle ideals of a new society and social harmony achieved through social 
policy and governing structures based on a new morality stood in stark contrast to the actual 
ground realities. As Liang Qichao observed, workers of the West were concerned with 
whether they were paid sufficiently to own property—a reality rather far removed from the 
economic situation of Chinese workers and peasants in early twentieth century China. After 
seeing the realities of the Chinese hinterland outside the economic and intellectual centres, 
Zhang Dongsun, too, realised that quick industrialisation to create wealth was the only 
solution to China’s social problems. Tackling poverty was considered a far more urgent issue 
than dreaming up lofty visions of a new society based on social harmony. For reformist 
socialists, the rise of the capitalist class was therefore seen as a necessary step on the way to 
socialism. It was also one key issue on which they differed from their revolutionary 
counterparts in the CCP. For reformist socialists, socialism was not about levelling down the 
rich—a thought later echoed by Deng Xiaoping, who declared that socialism did not mean 
equal poverty—but levelling up the poor, which could only be achieved through economic 
development. To reformist socialists, socialism was not about poverty or redistribution, but 
about creating more wealth for all. This meant that wealth creation through industrialisation 
and capitalist methods had to take precedence over issues of social inequality.
According to historian Arif Dirlik, in its origins, socialism in China was an instrument of 
national and political development, which, in the priority it assigned to national interest, 
allowed for the possibility of capitalist methods within socialist development as long as they 
furthered the national interest. As Dirlik argues, China rendered capitalism a dynamic source 
of national development, and regarded socialism as the guarantee of national unity against the 
socially divisive consequences of capitalism (Dirlik, 2005: 19). From the 1920s until today, 
the discussions and disagreements among socialists, and discord within the party after 1949 
centred on exactly what role capitalist methods were allowed to play and whether national 
needs, in terms of economic growth, for example, could be dissociated from the socialist 
ideology. Eventually, because of the strong nationalist character of the Chinese socialist 
project, capitalism was identified with Western imperialism—China’s ‘Other’—while 
socialism has been appropriated as a Chinese characteristic.
Reformers of the Republican period (1912-1949) believed in a moderate, evolutionary 
socialism, which served as a tool to tame or humanise capitalism. From this emerged a belief 
in social democracy, which was the mainstream of socialist thought during this era. Social 
democracy offered a vision of modernity that in one form or another was shared across the 
political spectrum. Evolving out of a group which Liang Qichao headed until his death in 
1929, the State Socialist Party was formed in 1934. It embraced Sun Yatsen’s ideals, but 
differed from the Guomindang in its rejection of one party rule and its advocacy of 
constitutionalism and individual liberty. The party represented a liberal socialism, which 
recognised the importance of capitalism, while hoping to regulate it through involvement of 
the state in the form of central planning. To them, the interests of the Chinese nation came 
before the interests of class6, which was regarded as an international or global concept.7 Other 
than Zhang Dongsun, the main proponents of this path were Zhang Junmai (1886-1929), and 
Luo Longji (1898-1965). Zhang Junmai (also known as Carsun Chang) was a social 
democratic politician, Luo Longji an intellectual and human rights theorist. During the war 
years, they formed part of the Chinese Democratic League, a loose association of smaller 
political parties, with a political agenda that was distinct from the Guomindang on the one 
hand and the Communists on the other. They were referred to as the so-called ‘Third Force’, 
which was politically liberal and promoted ‘fair distribution’, a minimum wage, an eight-hour 
day for workers, and absolute equality for women. They firmly believed in property rights and 
rejected the concept of class struggle (Fung, 2010: 224-238). As such, their platform 
resembled the welfare socialism of Europe, rather than a distinctly Chinese vision for the 
future.
Only Socialism can Save China: Mao’s Socialist Utopia
The reformist socialist thought represented by Liang Qichao, Zhang Junmai and Zhang 
Dongsun, which emphasised wealth creation before redistribution required peace and 
democratic processes—conditions not prevailing in China in the 1940s. Despite having some 
political currency, the reformists did not belong to the mainstream; these were middle-class 
intellectuals who had no experience of social activism or any involvement with the grassroots, 
and ultimately were not able to influence the social and political development of the following 
decades. This fell to Mao Zedong’s Communist Party, which emerged victoriously from the 
civil war against the Guomindang, and which established the People’s Republic of China in 
1949. 
Wang Hui, one of China’s foremost left-wing intellectuals, argues that from the start, 
modernization in China constituted a teleological historical perspective and worldview. 
Socialist modernization in China not only pointed to the difference between the socialist and 
the capitalist system, but it also implied an entire set of its own values. Modernization in the 
Chinese discourse includes inherent tendencies to socialist ideological content and values 
(Wang and Karl, 1998: 13), thereby resulting in the continuing dichotomy of Western 
capitalist modernity and Chinese socialist modernity. There is no question that Mao’s 
interpretation of socialism and the way he tried to implement it from the 1950s until his death 
were central in turning socialism into a marker of a Chinese official identity, with lasting 
effects till date.
Mao’s thinking on Chinese socialism evolved gradually. During the 1940s it was still based 
on a strategy of development that allowed for the continued existence of capitalism in the 
transition to socialism in order to develop the economy, although there were recurring debates 
over the role of capitalism on the road to socialism.8 During the decades that are now 
commonly referred to as the ‘Mao years’ (1958-1978), capitalism and socialism came to be 
distinguished much more sharply, even though questions of the relative importance of class 
interest and national interest remained even then, as socialist development was linked to 
national development (Dirlik, 2005: 41). While reform socialists, including Sun Yatsen, saw 
social organization as secondary to nation-building and liberation from foreign imperialism, 
Mao’s Communists did not consider these two processes to be sequential. To them, national 
development and social revolution were considered integral to one another – one could not be 
achieved without the other. The dominant thought pattern was that only socialism could save 
China.
It is not the intention here to list the failings of Mao’s policies in the name of socialism, or to 
discuss their disastrous consequences. Instead, this section attempts to highlight the 
continuities in socialist thinking before and after the Mao years, which hinge upon the 
concept of ‘otherness’, and which were brought into starker relief through Mao’s 
interpretation of Marxism-Leninism and the radical policies, which followed from it. Mao’s 
main shift with regard to Lenin and Stalin concerned the relationship between the working 
class and the peasantry; Mao considered Lenin’s and Stalin’s mistrust of the peasantry 
misguided, and, in lieu of a sizable urban proletariat, placing the peasantry (rather than the 
working class) at the heart of his theoretical thinking was an inevitable response to Chinese 
social realities. It resulted in a fundamental shift whereby the original theory was reinvented 
in a new context. As Slavoj Zizek puts it, 
the violent transplantation of a theory into a foreign context radically affects the original theory itself, 
so that, when this theory ‘returns to itself in its otherness’ (reinvents itself in the foreign context), its 
very substance changes - and yet this shift is not just the reaction to an external shock, it remains an 
inherent transformation of the same theory of the overcoming of capitalism (Mao and Zizek, 2007: 4).
From the very start, Chinese socialism, by virtue of providing a vision of a future society 
which, given the social realities at the time, required a much larger leap of faith than 
European socialist visions of the same period, had a strong utopian streak. This utopia of the 
socialist paradise of abundance became the official narrative of the Chinese state project 
during the Mao years. Communism, the ultimately desired endpoint in this teleological vision 
of history, was declared to be within reach and described by officials in the following terms:
After all, what does communism mean? ... First taking good food and not merely eating one's fill. At 
each meal one enjoys a meat diet, eating chicken, pork, fish or eggs....delicacies like monkey brains, 
swallows' nests, white fungi are served to each according to his needs...Second, clothing. Everything 
required is available. Clothing of various designs, styles, not a mass of black garments or a mass of blue 
outfits. After working hours, people will wear silk, satin and woollen suits....Foxes will multiply. When 
all people's communes raise foxes, there will be overcoats lined with fox furs...Third, housing. Housing 
is brought up to the standard of modern cities. What should be modernised? People’s communes. 
Central heating is provided in the north and air-conditioning in the south. All will live in high buildings. 
Needless to say, there are electric lights, telephones, piped water, receiving sets and TV...Fourth, 
communication. Except for those who take part in races, all travellers and commuters will use transport. 
Air services are opened in all directions and every county has an airport...The time is not remote when 
each will have an aeroplane. Fifth, higher education is for everyone and education is popularised. 
Communism means this: food, clothing, housing, transportation, cultural entertainment, science 
institutes, and physical culture. The sum total of these means Communism (quoted from a Red Guard 
magazine in MacFarquhar, 1983: 84.)
Utopian in the 1950s, in today’s China much of it has been realised or even exceeded. Mao’s 
own utopian thinking rested on a more theoretical and ideological plain – quite possibly 
enabled by the relative comfort in which he lived throughout his life as a leader. In the area of 
industrial development, Mao’s main aim was to break down the barrier between the more 
developed urban and the less developed rural areas, the main theoretical argument behind the 
follies and disasters of the Great Leap Forward9 (1958-61). Continuous revolution was 
considered a necessary process to change cultural values and beliefs, and to prevent a 
reverting to capitalism; the fate of individuals was of no concern to Mao’s visions of a 
socialist society. As Rana Mitter (2004) has argued, Mao’s Cultural Revolution must be seen 
as an exaggerated and extreme manifestation of the iconoclastic spirit of the May Fourth 
Movement,10 which was the first to vehemently question China’s cultural traditions. But there 
are also those who insist on a positive legacy from the Cultural Revolution, in particular once 
the violence of the first two years had been controlled. Academics like Mobo Gao point to 
massive infrastructure programmes, radical educational reforms, innovative experimentation 
in literature and the arts, an expansion of healthcare and education in rural areas and rapid 
development of rural enterprises, some of which have laid the foundations for the successes of 
the reform era (Gao, 2008: 5).
Nonetheless, the rosy image of the Chinese socialist paradise was primarily confined to 
fiction and art, including the propaganda posters of the period, which despite our knowledge 
about the reality of living conditions of the time continue to exude a strange fascination. Gone 
further than any other socialist revolution, China’s Cultural Revolution for a while, and seen 
from afar, provided great inspiration to Europe’s left-wing elite. Although a product of the 
Western intellectual tradition, socialism had turned into something ‘other’—a different way of 
life and politics—onto which dreams of alternative social realities could be projected. 
From Socialism with Chinese Characteristics to Socialism as a Chinese Characteristic
It is Deng Xiaoping (1904-1997), who is credited to be the father of China’s economic 
reforms encapsulated in ‘The Four Modernizations’, the central policy that emerged from the 
third plenum of the 11th party congress in 1978. It referred to four main areas of 
modernization, which were agriculture, industry, science and technology, and national 
defence. One key element of the reforms was ‘opening up’, a literal reference to the opening 
of borders and restrictions on communications and international exchange, but also a more 
metaphorical reference to liberalisation. Deng is famously associated with a pragmatic 
approach to economic policy and considered responsible for China’s embrace of capitalist 
methods, or as Wang Hui has put it, for China’s “complete conformism to the dictates of 
capital and the activities of the market” (Wang and Karl, 1998: 9). However, the emphasis on 
the results of Deng’s reforms and the rapid change they brought to China risks overlooking 
the ideological links between Mao and Deng on the one hand, and the continuity between 
early reform socialist thinking during the Republican period and Chinese socialism today. 
Crucially, Deng, while clearly influenced by the economic realities of the Mao years, referred 
to pre-1949 socialist thinking (particularly Zhang Dongsun) when he declared that socialism 
did not mean equal poverty. His ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics’ was defined as 
eliminating exploitation and attaining common wealth; as a political program to develop 
market tools while rejecting capitalist vices, thus still echoing the search for an alternative 
modernity. He wanted to develop a market economy, which, as Deng argued, would result in 
an all inclusive ‘xiaokang’ (moderately prosperous) society (Lin, 2006: 5), thus resorting to 
early Chinese cultural terminology to describe a certain stage of development on the road to 
socialism.
Instead of repudiating ‘Mao Zedong Thought’11
in its entirety, Deng chose to reinterpret the very definition of Mao Zedong Thought, which 
under him was expanded and considered to include thought by Liu Shaoqi (1898-1969), Zhou 
Enlai (1989-1976) and Deng Xiaoping himself. Furthermore, the selective use of Mao Zedong 
Thought and its evaluation in the early 1980s as being ’70 percent good, 30 percent bad’ has 
led to the paradoxical situation that not all of Mao Zedong’s thought is now in fact considered 
to be part of Mao Zedong Thought (Mackerrass, Taneeja, and Young, 1998: 102). In that way, 
Deng achieved a ‘reform and opening up’ of China’s ideological foundation, allowing it to 
grow and expand, and laying the foundation for the future inclusion of new ideological 
projects, including Deng’s own gaige kaifang (reform and opening up). Xi Jinping’s 2013 
communiqué lists Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought, Deng Xiaoping Theory, ‘The 
Three Represents’12 (Jiang Zemin’s legacy) and ‘scientific development’ (a nod to Hu Jintao) 
as the core ideological underpinnings of the Chinese state today.
Although China is now commonly referred to as a ‘post-socialist’13 society, in ideological 
terms there are no signs that China’s party-state has left socialism behind. On the contrary, 
socialism remains a key ingredient of the ‘China model’, and an important characteristic in 
Chinese national identity construction. What has shifted, together with the re-evaluation of 
Mao Zedong, is the primacy of the economy in the project of building socialism, and the 
accepted theory that China is still in the ‘initial stages of socialism’. Simply put, the CCP 
today is as committed to the project of building socialism as Mao was; what has changed is 
the timeframe within which this is seen to be achievable, and the role capitalist methods are 
allowed to play in this project. 
One sign that beliefs and values of socialism have not been entirely dismissed is the question 
of landownership. Proposals for inheritable landownership rights to be bestowed on small 
farmers were defeated in 1992. Although there have been reforms since, land reforms, i.e. far-
reaching reforms regarding the ownership and right to sell land, continue to be anticipated in 
China, but have so far failed to materialise. At the same time, Xi Jinping’s afore-mentioned 
communiqué stresses the importance of state-owned industry and the dominant role of the 
public-ownership system, despite the emphasis on the market as a decisive factor in the 
economy. The document sounds reminiscent of Mao when it points to the dual structure of 
town and country as the main obstacle restraining the integration of urban and rural 
development, and sees the answer in new types of industry-agriculture and urban-rural 
relationships where industry stimulates agriculture (Xi, 2013).
Far from being irrelevant, political theory remains important in today’s China. In the absence 
of a democratic process, ownership of theory forms an important source of legitimacy, 
although there are few signs that the theory is received in the population at large. However, 
the fact that the CCP has not officially renounced socialist values also means that they can be 
invoked in grassroots protests. In fact, as Gao Mobo argues, the concept of class struggle, 
while rejected by the party and the intelligentsia, is one legacy from the Mao era that has 
made the farmer and other ordinary Chinese aware of their rights and of the idea of equality 
(Gao, 2008: 192). Equally, many of the generation that has worked in the rural areas during 
the Cultural Revolution are willing to speak for the rural poor, or are the party’s most scathing 
critics. In them, the combination of socialist ideals, including class struggle, is enacted as non-
referential criticism of the incumbent leadership. It is thus ironic that it is the generation that 
allegedly suffered most during the Cultural Revolution, that is often most critical of the 
current regime’s abandonment of socialist principles in practice.
Intellectuals in China and abroad today also try to salvage positive lessons from the calamities 
of the Mao years and their write-off in official historiography and international publications 
as ‘ten lost years’. An interesting, but often overlooked fact is that those criticizing the 
Chinese government from the extreme left are subject to similar forms of repression to those 
advocating political reform in the liberal sense. The internet is often presented as a forum of 
liberal democratic dissent, but it is important to note that ultra-left and Maoist voices also use 
the same technology and medium to debate salient political points, or to criticize the current 
leadership’s take on the Mao years.14 
In Mobo Gao’s words,
negative lessons can be drawn from the Mao era, so that violence should be avoided as much as possible and 
measures should be taken before violence erupts. Positive lessons—such as popular democracy; grassroots 
participation in management and production; and cheap and locally adopted and traditionally proved healthcare 
and education—can also be drawn from the Mao era. The ideas and practices of Chinese socialist democracy 
should be made use of. It is along these lines that we should imagine an alternative model of development in 
China. Modernity does not have to be totally Western either in terms of governance or in terms of production 
organization and technology’ (Gao, 2008: 201).
This alternative modernity—or ‘China Dream’, as it is now commonly referred to—continues 
to be characterized by the insistence on Chinese exceptionalism, which according to Kang 
Xiaoguang’s definition includes a notion of racial superiority, a unique China model, an elitist 
government, a paternalistic dictatorship, and radical cultural difference.15
Chinese liberals, on the other hand, have very little time for either positive considerations of 
the Mao years, or notions of a ‘benign Confucian dictatorship’. Liberalism has become the 
most important political orientation of reform-minded intellectuals in China since the 1990s, 
although by far not all who consider themselves liberals agree with the desirability of a multi-
party democracy in China. Similar to the afore-mentioned Chinese Democratic League of the 
1940s, Chinese liberals today not only strive for individual freedoms and seek to replace the 
Leninist party-state, but also address the issue of social inequality. In their view, the unfair 
distribution of resources in China today is the direct result of continuing power structures 
which dominate the allocation and control of those resources through political power and 
privileges established in the decades prior to the reform era (Wielander, 2013: 132; see also 
Garnaut, 2012).
Arguably, China is already socialist in so far as it has a socialist economic system, a socialist 
ideology, and a socialist political system (Mackerrass et al., 1998: 104 ff.), all of which have 
been confirmed and declared in need of strengthening through reform (Xi, 2013). The country 
has a socialist political system by virtue of being ruled by the Communist Party, whose 
prerogative it is to define the term socialism and all associated terms, and who claims to be 
the leading force in social transformation. In the party’s view, some parts of China are still 
‘poor and backward’, therefore ‘socialist modernization’—as mentioned again by Xi 
Jinping—through industrialization and economic development has priority over other aspects. 
In this way, anything seen as economically productive can be interpreted as being in the 
interest of socialism, even though it may result in stark social inequality and environmental 
degradation. While the plentiful vision of a future communist society as expressed by Tan 
Chenlin in 1958 (quoted above) has been more or less realised in today’s China, the following 
vision of the same time remains a utopia. 
Can we cover more and more of the mountains in the whole district with green trees, and make the 
streams clearer each year? Can we make the soil more fertile and make the faces of the people in every 
village glow with health? (Qin Chaoyang, Village Sketches, as quoted in Becker, 1996: 60).
If there is one cause in present-day China that galvanizes solidarity and serves as a common 
denominator across social class and interest groups, it is the state of the environment and the 
impact it has on the individual’s health and wellbeing. In Zizek’s words, “China as the 
emerging superpower of the twenty-first century thus seems to embody a new kind of 
capitalism: disregard for ecological consequences, repression of workers’ rights, everything 
subordinated to the ruthless drive to develop” (Mao and Zizek, 2007: 18). Although the 
Chinese government is now working hard to address these problems (and the environment is a 
firm policy priority), many of those who can afford it are seeking an alternative modernity—
by moving to the West.
Conclusion: Chinese Socialism—An Alternative Pathway to a Common Dream
When socialism started to be debated in China, there was no Western proto-type to refer to. 
While capitalism was there to be observed, to be critiqued and to be experienced, socialism 
provided an unknown alternative. Instead of taking the path the West had travelled down, 
China, further behind on the road to modernity, consciously chose a different route. Socialism 
offered the possibility of modernization without Westernization; it vaguely chimed with 
Chinese cultural values and yet provided a framework and ideological justification for a 
radical overhaul of Chinese society. From the start, socialism held the promise of a better 
future, a better China. It promised something modern, yet not Western, something radical and 
attractive as so alluringly and deceptively projected by the images of the Mao period. 
Socialism represented an ‘otherness’ that had not yet found a realisation in the West and thus 
offered the chance of shaping and defining it in Chinese terms. 
In this process of shaping, socialism has become a defining element of official Chinese 
identity; although referred to as ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics’ it is apt to say that 
socialism has officially become a Chinese characteristic. It is a conscious placing of China as 
an ‘Other’ to the West’s democratic, capitalist societies. The emphasis on this ‘otherness’ has 
guided China’s engagement with socialism and is encapsulated in Xi’s phrase of the ‘Chinese 
dream’. It is likely to find a different expression again come the next leadership. For now, 
China’s dream of socialism is associated with vague notions of a happy future that is proudly 
Chinese; prosperous yet egalitarian; industrialised yet environment-friendly; an attractive 
utopia on which the party wishes to build as a stable basis for political consensus.
In Zhang Lijia’s memoir Socialism is Great (2007) the author recounts how in the 1980s her 
mother chided her for dreaming of being a journalist, when she was supposed to be happy for 
the opportunity to be a worker and the security that came with this position. Her boss in the 
factory also derided a fellow worker for dreaming in bright daylight. During China’s ‘socialist 
period’ all ambition and aspiration was relegated to the world of dreams and fantasy it seems. 
Now these dreams have found a place in the party’s most recent political manifesto in the 
hope to tie people’s dreams to the party, and with the underlying expectation that by holding 
on to the party, China will be able to realise its dreams. But at an individual level these 
dreams—regardless of any claims to Chinese exceptionalism—are far from being distinct or 
‘other’; they bear a strong resemblance to the dreams of ordinary people anywhere in the 
world—dreams of living a moderately prosperous life in a healthy and safe environment. 
Endnotes
1
 Kang Youwei (1858-1927) was a prominent scholar and reformer of the late Qing dynasty. He was one of the 
main proponents of a constitutional monarchy and the author of the utopia Datong Shu, or Book of Great Unity.
2
 The ‘Book of Rites’ is one of the ‘Five Classics’ in the Confucian canon. It is a collection of articles with a 
focus on etiquette and music, but spanning a wide range of other topics including morality, politics, law, and 
philosophy of the pre-Qin period (before 220 BC).
3
 This approach was, however, not confined to reformist socialists: in their discussion groups at Beijing 
University, two of China’s earliest Marxists, Qu Qiubai (1899-1935) and Li Dazhao (1888-1927), also cast 
Marxism in classical terms, referring to Confucian and Daoist principles. According to Mahoney (2008: 110) 
datong was described in terms of egalitarian fraternalism and public over private ownership while xiaokang was 
described as a period in which the pursuit of great harmony is sacrificed in order to confront the fragmented and 
contradictory social conditions of the day. These terms and concepts, which were subsequently more closely 
defined by Mao, have been in use to this day and continue to be included in Xi Jinping’s communiqué following 
the third plenum of the 18th party congress.
4
 For details, see Brian Tsui, this volume. 
5
 For a detailed discussion see Wielander (2013), chapter 7.
6
 According to Marxism, all societies are divided into classes, most notably the bourgeoisie and the proletariat; 
in order to achieve social change, the proletariat must overcome the bourgeoisie through class struggle, a concept 
considered universally applicable.
7
 For a further discussion on the aspect of ‘class’ in the Chinese context, see Tsui, this volume.
8
 The key document outlining Mao’s thinking of this time is ‘On New Democracy’; for the complete text see 
http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-2/mswv2_26.htm (last access: 18 
November 2014).
9
 The ‘Great Leap Forward’ was a campaign launched in 1958, which intensified the pace of collectivization in 
agriculture while aiming at a higher industrial output, primarily in steel production. 
10
 The May Fourth Movement takes its name from student protests against the outcome of the Versailles Treaty, 
which took place on 4 May 1919. The movement itself is generally understood to have lasted for several years 
around this date and included political and cultural aspects. It is sometimes referred to as China’s 
‘Enlightenment’. 
11
 ‘Mao Zedong Thought’, or Mao Zedong sixiang in Chinese, is the official term for the body of Mao’s 
theoretical thinking.
12
 The ‘Three-Represents’ is a guiding socio-political theory credited to Jiang Zemin, the then General Secretary 
of the Communist Party, which was ratified by the Communist Party of China at the Sixteenth Party Congress in 
2002. The official statement of the ideology stipulates that the Communist Party of China should be 
representative to advanced social productive forces, advanced culture, and the interests of the overwhelming 
majority.
13
 ‘Post-socialist’ is a term used to denote a phase of development in countries following previous communist 
regimes and a centrally planned economy. 
14
 For a more detailed discussion on the role of the internet and soft power in China see Mareike Ohlberg, this 
volume. 
15
 Kang is a prominent scholar famous for his call for Confucianism to become China’s state religion15. 
(Callahan, 2013: 156).
